Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Volume 33 | Issue 1

Fall 2012

CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling National
Security Review Frameworks as a Countermeasure
to Economic Espionage in the Age of Globalization
Souvik Saha
Northwestern University

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Recommended Citation
Souvik Saha, CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling National Security Review Frameworks as a Countermeasure to Economic Espionage in the
Age of Globalization, 33 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 199 (2012).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol33/iss1/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling
National Security Review Frameworks
as a Countermeasure to Economic
Espionage in the Age of Globalization
By Souvik Saha*
Abstract: The era of globalization has produced previously unimaginable
economic benefits by spurring linkages between countries through trade and
foreign investment. This newfound interconnectivity, however,
also
raises
national security concerns for countries, such as the United States, that welcome
foreign investment in the form of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers. Part II
highlights one such threat stemming from the rise of China and its aggressive
foreign investment strategy to acquire American companies in industries critical
to national security. In response to the growing threat of economic espionage
from foreign investors, the United States created the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS)—a national security review process for
foreign mergers and acquisitions. Part III analyzes the evolution of CFIUS,
while Part IV introduces China’s freshly minted model for analogous national
security reviews. Given the rise of these dueling frameworks in the world’s two
largest economies, critics contend that such national security reviews inject nontransparency, uncertainty, and politics into viable investment opportunities.
Part V addresses these concerns and demonstrates that such criticisms are
either overblown or outweighed in the post-9/11 world.

* J.D., expected May 2013, Northwestern University School of Law; M.A., 2010, Columbia
University; B.A., 2006, University of California, Berkeley.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When asked whether the United States or China were perpetrators of
industrial espionage, Julian Assange declared, “The U.S. is one of the
victims.”1 The disclosure smacks of irony given its source, a man dedicated
to proliferating corporate and governmental secrets in the name of freedom
of information. Yet, the United States’ vulnerability to espionage—military
or economic—is hardly a secret. While many believe that spy games are a
relic of the Cold War, the United States, and presumably all developed
economies, remain on high alert. Those operating on the frontlines of
American counter-intelligence efforts echo the sentiment: “The Cold War is
not over, it has merely moved into a new arena: the global marketplace.”2
Indeed, the critically acclaimed “Age of Globalization” is upon us, and
it features rapidly developing economies linked together in a mounting
global market. The promise of globalization is well-documented as a force
that is “enlarg[ing] the world economy, promot[ing] technological
1
Andy Greenberg, An Interview with WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange, FORBES (Nov. 29,
2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2010/11/29/an-interview-withwikileaks-julian-assange/.
2
Economic Espionage, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/counterintelligence/economic-espionage (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
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innovations, foster[ing] universal political participation, and enhanc[ing]
international cooperation.”3 Unlike the rhetoric of the Cold War, the new
vernacular emphasizes mutual economic development rather than mutually
assured destruction. In the process of “integrat[ing] markets, transportation
systems, and communication systems,” globalization renders “national
boundaries immaterial.”4 In light of these previously unimaginable
economic benefits, it is unsurprising that the initial reviews of globalization
are overwhelmingly positive.5
While the United States has benefited greatly from this global
transformation, the remarkable and unprecedented expansion of China’s
global presence is one of the principal narratives of globalization.6 A key
ingredient in China’s grand strategy of expansion—foreign direct
investment (FDI)—continues to raise serious concerns in the United States.
Simply stated, “Foreign ownership of an American corporation provides a
presence for that parent company’s country in the United States.”7 This
creates a potential conduit for leaking American technology, intellectual
property, and sensitive information pertaining to critical infrastructure.
Repeated Chinese attempts to purchase American companies, particularly in
markets deemed essential to national security, are alarming to policymakers
given China’s challenge to American economic leadership.8
In response to this potential threat, the United States has crafted an
elaborate legislative framework to review foreign mergers and acquisitions
for national security implications. Pursuant to the Defense Production Act
of 1950, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS)9 is now charged with implementing the review process. Seen as
an impediment to trade liberalization, however, some argue that CFIUS
threatens economic productivity, potentially in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.10 They argue that such discrimination not only threatens future
FDI in American markets, but also could lead to retaliatory measures by
rebuffed investors, such as China, to the detriment of American investors
attempting to enter into markets abroad.11
3
Arthur C. Helton & Dessie P. Zagorcheva, Globalization, Terror, and the Movements
of People, 36 INT’L LAW. 91, 92 (2002).
4
Joseph Mamounas, Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic Assets: The
Challenge of Maintaining National Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World, 13 L.
& BUS. REV. AM. 381, 382 (2007).
5
E.g., id. at 383.
6
See infra Part II.B.
7
Mamounas, supra note 4, at 384.
8
See infra Part II.A.
9
Defense Production Act of 1950 §721, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012).
10
Mamounas, supra note 4, at 393.
11
Gaurav Sud, Note, From Fretting Takeovers to Vetting CFIUS: Finding a Balance in
U.S. Policy Regarding Foreign Acquisitions of Domestic Assets, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.

201

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:199 (2012)

That fear of Chinese retaliation recently proved prescient. In early
2011, China codified its own national security review framework that
mirrors the functionality of CFIUS.12 In light of this recent development,
there is a renewed debate concerning the necessity, scope, and wisdom of
the current national security review process, which potentially impedes
trade and free market economics. This Comment seeks to address the rise
of these dueling national security review frameworks in the United States
and China.
In Part II, this Comment contextualizes the potential Chinese threat via
FDI. This includes a snapshot of the current U.S.-China trade relationship,
as well as the most recent threat analysis according to the U.S. intelligence
community. Part III provides a detailed glimpse of the U.S. national
security review process for foreign mergers and acquisitions, including
recent developments involving CFIUS. As a juxtaposition, Part IV
introduces the Chinese counterpart to CFIUS, and provides a comparison of
the two national security review frameworks. Part V proceeds to respond to
the common criticisms of CFIUS through a case study approach. This
Comment contends that the alleged economic costs of CFIUS are both
exaggerated and outweighed by the threat of economic espionage. Finally,
Part VI concludes that CFIUS, through its various iterations, strikes the
proper balance between national security and economic interests.
II.

THE TWO FACES OF GLOBALIZATION AND THE THREAT
FROM CHINA
Despite the many benefits of globalization, there also exists a darker
underside that is becoming exceedingly apparent. While globalization
expands economies, it also amplifies the inequalities that are inherent
within market capitalism, often at the expense of the poor.13 However, the
negative externalities of globalization are not confined to the underdogs; its
effects are also felt in developed countries. Just as globalization re-directs
human capital into higher-skilled positions, U.S. workers lacking requisite
qualifications are left vulnerable to the cold, profit-maximizing calculus of
outsourcing.14 Coupled with the global recession, “millions of citizens have
lost steady work . . . and a race to the bottom has been ignited abroad.”15
The recent “Occupy Movement” is a testament to these social and economic
ills.
1303, 1325 (2006).
12
Lester Ross & Kenneth Zhou, China Adopts its Own ‘CFIUS’ Regulations,
WILMERHALE
(Feb.
28,
2011),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=9726.
13
Helton & Zagorcheva, supra note 3.
14
Mamounas, supra note 4, at 383–84.
15
Id. at 384.
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Furthermore, the era of globalization cannot be understood through the
lens of an economic narrative alone. Rather, a tale of two simultaneous
transformations—one economic, the other political—more accurately
describes our rapidly-changing world. The free flow of people, ideas, and
technologies—the trademark features of globalization—enables stagnant
markets to flourish, but also de-stabilizes political institutions.16 The
growing influence of transnational actors is not limited to multinational
corporations; it also facilitates global crime syndicates and international
terrorists.17 The tragic events of September 11, 2001 provide a dramatic
lesson in the destructive potential of such stateless groups. Yet, the ensuing
“Age of Terror” is ultimately couched within the broader meta-narrative of
globalization, and thus, is both a subset and a byproduct of the changing
landscape of international relations.18 Such unintended consequences
present detrimental challenges to both U.S. leadership and national security.
A. Globalization as a Challenge to American Hegemony
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has enjoyed sole
superpower status.19 However, one of the more recent, principal storylines
within the narrative of globalization has been the meteoric rise of China,
both economically and militarily, as a threat to U.S. hegemony. In the face
of a lingering recession in the United States, China has continued its strong
economic expansion with yearly double-digit GDP growth.20 As the United
States’ “unipolar moment” inevitably gives way to a bipolar world marked
by China’s ascendancy, some predict a violent transition in the global world
order.21 Whether China intends for a peaceful rise to superpower status visà-vis the United States remains to be seen.
However, one thing is fairly certain: China intends to harness the full
scope of economic opportunities within the international marketplace in its
quest for regional and global dominance. “The most farsighted Chinese
leaders understand that globalization has changed the game and that China
accordingly needs strong, prosperous partners around the world.”22 Indeed,
16

Helton & Zagorcheva, supra note 3, at 92–93.
Mamounas, supra note 4, at 384.
18
See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT (2008).
19
See Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, Reshaping the World Order: How
Washington Should Reform International Institutions, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.–Apr. 2009; G.
John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System
Survive, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.–Feb. 2008.
20
Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 112th Cong.
12 (2011) [hereinafter Intelligence Hearings] (statement of James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l
Intelligence).
21
Ikenberry, supra note 19, at 26.
22
Id. at 30.
17
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the recipe for China’s dramatic economic growth features an aggressive
combination of an unparalleled supply of cheap labor, increased foreign
investment, and its comparative advantage in trade.23
The remarkable and unprecedented expansion of China’s global
presence is well-documented. Indeed, three decades of near double-digit
economic expansion has provided ample time for the world to take notice.24
While the Soviet Union’s policy of militarization as a means of expanding
its sphere of influence ultimately proved unsustainable, China has instead
focused on harnessing the opportunities of globalization. “China’s embrace
of foreign investment and trade has helped drive its transformation into a
global economic powerhouse.”25 Despite China’s fairly recent economic
liberalization, foreign capital has provided an integral boost to its growth as
well. In particular, the inflow of foreign capital has allowed for the transfer
of “advanced technology” that has propelled its economy, as well as its
“military and intelligence communities and, as a result, national security.”26
This sensational economic growth, coupled with China’s formidable
military prowess, seemingly places it on a collision course with the United
States. However, the implications of this growing challenge to U.S.
hegemony remain hotly contested.27 Some are hopeful that the United
States can accommodate China’s rise within the architecture of global,
liberal institutions, thereby avoiding a “volcanic struggle” that promises
catastrophe in light of their respective military capabilities.28 In fact, U.S.
policymakers seemingly agreed with this proposition, given the United
States’ critical role in paving the way for China’s accession into the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.29
However, the past decade of China’s involvement in the WTO has
generated mixed results, tempering such hopeful projections. On one hand,
the United States and China have certainly engaged one another in a deeply
entrenched economic relationship. By 2010, “China was the second-largest

23

The
Chinese
Economy,
ECONOMY
WATCH,
(June
30,
2010),
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/china/?page=full.
24
U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 111TH CONG., ANN. REP. ON U.S.-CHINA
TRADE RELATIONSHIP 17 (Comm. Print 2010).
25
Eric Jensen, Balancing Security and Growth: Defining National Security Review of
Foreign Investment in China, 19 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 161, 164 (2010).
26
Id.
27
See generally Ikenberry, supra note 21.
28
Id. at 33–34.
29
WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33536, CHINA-U.S. TRADE ISSUES
24 (2011) (“Many U.S. policymakers at the time maintained that China’s WTO membership
would encourage the Chinese government to deepen market reforms, promote the rule of
law, reduce the government’s role in the economy, further integrate China into the world
economy, and enable the United States to use the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism to
address major trade issues.”).
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U.S. trading partner (after Canada), the third-largest U.S. export market
(after Canada and Mexico), and the largest source of U.S. imports.”30 On
the other hand, the trade relationship with China has perpetuated deepseated asymmetries that threaten U.S. interests. Trade with China has led to
a dramatically lop-sided trade deficit,31 and China’s aggressive policy of
investing in U.S. debt provides political leverage, especially during tough
economic times in the United States.32
B. China as a Threat to U.S. National Security
A more direct threat stems from China’s current FDI policy in
advanced economies, such as the United States. Not only do foreign
mergers and acquisitions provide a foothold for the parent company’s
country in the United States, they enable opportunities for unwanted
proliferation of valuable intellectual property to foreign powers.33
Arguably, “such investment is done largely to transfer technology and
know-how to Chinese firms, but do little to help the U.S. economy.”34 This
becomes problematic where Chinese multinational companies, some of
which are government-sponsored, attempt to acquire American companies
that deal with strategic assets or critical infrastructures. This fear played a
central role in forcing Lenovo, a company primarily owned by the Chinese
government, to restructure its 2004 bid to acquire IBM’s personal computer
business.35 “[T]he Departments of Justice and Homeland Security were
especially concerned about Chinese infiltration of computer systems.” 36
Ultimately, the U.S. government demanded that both companies overcome
national security concerns by physically sealing off the buildings that
Lenovo and IBM would occupy in a shared complex in North Carolina.37
Alternatively, the presence of Chinese companies in certain markets
might directly corrupt manufacturing and distribution processes that cater to
U.S. governmental use.38 The notion that domestic products or services
could be compromised to enable foreign powers to eavesdrop, copy, or steal
30

Id. at 1.
Id. (“The U.S. trade deficit with China has surged over the past two decades, as U.S.
imports from China have grown much faster than U.S. exports to China.”).
32
Id. at 10–14.
33
Robert Gray Blacknell, Trust Not Their Presents, Nor Admit the Horse: Countering
the Technically-Based Espionage Threat, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 832, 856 (2007).
34
Morrison, supra note 29, at 17.
35
Id. at 17–18.
36
Anthony Michael Sabino, Transactions That Imperil National Security: A Look at the
Government’s Power to Say “No”, N.Y. ST. B.A.J., January 2005, at 20, 22.
37
Id.
38
Blacknell, supra note 33, at 838–39 (referencing the computer chip,
telecommunication, and information systems as U.S. industries that are vulnerable to
corruption in the manufacturing phase).
31
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sensitive data or technology is not Hollywood fiction; it is a legitimate
threat. For example, the U.S. national security review process recently
scuttled Bain Capital’s buyout of 3Com because it would have provided the
Chinese company Huawei a minority stake in 3Com. “The specific concern
was that Huawei would gain access to the equipment maker’s technology
which is used by the [U.S.] Defense Department.”39 Accordingly,
investment policies must consider the risk of economic espionage through
foreign acquisition of U.S. companies whose products may ultimately affect
consumers within the U.S. national security apparatus.40
The threat of economic espionage emanating from China is
increasingly a concern for U.S. national security interests. While China has
focused heavily on economic growth through trade partnerships, its success
has translated into a dramatic increase in its power potential relative to other
countries. In particular, the United States’ lop-sided trade deficit with
China endows China with the upper hand in the economic sector, which
subsequently provides China financial capital and technical expertise to
expand its military capability and political clout.41
This newfound power potential has shifted Chinese behavior toward its
trading partners, as well as its traditional regional foes. The most recent
threat assessments from the U.S. intelligence community suggest a growing
assertiveness within China’s international policies.42 China seemingly
perceives that its economic success translates into increased clout to pursue
its diplomatic and foreign policy objectives.43 For example, in addition to
its outright support for North Korea’s recent military aggression toward
South Korea, China has also advanced its efforts to expand territorial claims
in the South China Sea, and has adopted intimidation tactics against Japan
over fishing rights near disputed island territories.44
39

Steven Globerman & Daniel Shapiro, Economic and Strategic Considerations
Surrounding Chinese FDI in the United States, 26 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 163, 174 (2009).
40
Blacknell, supra note 33, at 841 (“Prudent counterespionage policy also requires a
failsafe process on the U.S. end of the transaction to verify the efforts of the supplying
companies, by assessing risk posed by foreign acquisitions of domestic business
organizations and by detecting the existence of technically-based espionage devices or
apparatus that slip through the company’s processes, in order to manage and apportion
risk.”).
41
U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 24, at 14.
42
Intelligence Hearings, supra note 20 (statement of James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l
Intelligence) (“China’s rise drew increased international attention over the past year, as
several episodes of assertive Chinese behavior fueled perceptions of Beijing as a more
imposing and potentially difficult international actor.”).
43
Id.
44
U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 24, at 15 (“China has
undermined the progress it had made over the past decade in promoting its peaceful rise with
a renewed assertiveness in advancing its sovereignty claims to large areas in the East and
South China Seas.”).
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Moreover, China’s increasing aggressiveness has spilled over into its
economic policies. China has not concealed its desire to acquire trade
secrets, sensitive information, and advanced technology through its
investment policy. “[S]ome businesses have publicly declared that they
gradually are being squeezed out of Chinese markets by government
policies that first demand technology transfer in exchange for market
access.”45 Recently, the chairman of BASF Corporation criticized China’s
policy of requiring disclosure of intellectual property as a precondition to
conduct business in China.46 Thus, China’s thirst for advanced technology
and access to intellectual property from foreign companies is quite
apparent.
In addition to its aggressive economic policies, China has allegedly
resorted to economic espionage through cyberspace.47 The Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive warns that China has been at the
forefront of accelerating efforts of “foreign economic collection and
industrial espionage activities against major [U.S.] corporations.”48 The
modes of economic espionage vary from the use of corporate insiders to
sophisticated online hacking. For example, “China’s intelligence services,
as well as private companies and other entities, frequently seek to exploit
Chinese citizens or persons with family ties to China who can use their
insider access to corporate networks to steal trade secrets.”49 While this
Comment will sidestep an in-depth discussion of the threat of cyber
espionage, recent high-profile attempts to hack into major U.S.
corporations, such as Google, offer significant anecdotal evidence of the
rising threat of economic espionage emanating from China.50
U.S. intelligence reports corroborate the fears of China’s desire to
acquire sensitive economic information from U.S. corporations through
illicit means. Given this threat, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
unsurprisingly places counter-intelligence as its number two priority, only
behind countering the more direct physical threat of terrorism.51 While
calculating the exact cost of such economic espionage is difficult, the FBI
estimates that “every year billions of U.S. dollars are lost to foreign and
domestic competitors who deliberately target economic intelligence in
45

Id. at 20.
Id.
47
Id. at 15.
48
OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING US
ECONOMIC SECRETS IN CYBERSPACE, 112TH CONG., REP. TO CONG. ON FOREIGN ECON.
COLLECTION & INDUS. ESPIONAGE 1 (Comm. Print. 2011).
49
Id. at 5. This intelligence report also states that “[o]f the seven cases that were
adjudicated under the Economic Espionage Act . . . in fiscal year 2010, six involved a link to
China.” Id.
50
Morrison, supra note 29, at 18.
51
Economic Espionage, supra note 2.
46
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flourishing U.S. industries and technologies.”52 Yet, the “knowledge of
cyber-enabled economic espionage threats to the U.S. private sector
remains limited.”53 This reality highlights the importance of vetting foreign
mergers and acquisitions into critical U.S. markets that implicate national
security. The threat of economic espionage is real, and national security
reviews of proposed FDIs are an invaluable tool to curb the potential
transfer of American trade secrets and critical technologies.
III. THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Since World War II, the United States has been at the forefront of
promoting economic liberalization in the international system.54 The
United States has not only invested in various economies around the world,
but its own economy has remained one of the key destinations for foreign
capital. Accordingly, the United States has “negotiate[d] internationally for
reduced restrictions on foreign direct investment, for greater rules on
incentives offered to foreign investors, and for equal treatment under law of
foreign and domestic investors.”55 The United States’ commitment to an
open investment policy has arguably served as one of the hallmarks of U.S.
diplomatic policy.56
Nonetheless, national security considerations have always been
recognized as a caveat to any investment policy. Accordingly, “Most
governments also have some form of statutory review process for foreign
mergers and acquisitions in the domestic economy that look at a myriad of
issues, including national security.”57 The challenge, however, lies in
balancing two oft-competing interests: promoting an economy that is open
to foreign investment and protecting national security from foreign threats.
The U.S. national security review framework for foreign investment has
faced this challenge at every stage of its evolution.
A. Historical Development of the U.S. Model
The need for a national security review process in the United States
became apparent in the 1970s as a result of the devaluation of the U.S.

52

Id.
OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., supra note 48, at A-1.
54
Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional
Involvement is Too Much?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 327 (2007).
55
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34561, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
NATIONAL SECURITY: ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 7 (2010).
56
Sud, supra note 11, at 1314.
57
Stephen Sothmann, Let He Who is Without Sin Cast the First Stone: Foreign Direct
Investment and National Security Regulation in China, 19 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 203,
205 (2009).
53
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dollar, which led to an influx of FDI.58 In response, Congress passed the
Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, which directed the Secretaries of
Treasury and Commerce to review all foreign direct and portfolio
investments.59 That comprehensive review demonstrated that Congress
lacked an effective mechanism to examine the potential security
implications of FDI. As a result, President Ford established the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in 1975.60
The purpose of this body was to observe “the impact of foreign
investment in the [United States] . . . and coordinat[e] the implementation
of United States Policy on such investment.”61 Yet initially, “CFIUS’s only
power was to monitor investments and request foreign governments to file
preliminary reports regarding their foreign investment activities.”62 Thus,
CFIUS was conceived as a paper tiger with little to no enforcement power
of its own.
This glaring limitation surfaced most notably in 1987 with the
attempted acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor Co. by Japanese
computer company Fujitsu Ltd. The proposed sale sparked vehement
congressional opposition because “officials believed that the deal would
give Japan control over a major supplier of computer chips for the
military,” thereby “mak[ing] U.S. defense industries more dependent on
foreign suppliers for sophisticated high-technology products.”63 Congress
felt helpless given CFIUS’s impotency in blocking foreign mergers and
acquisitions that might threaten national security. Congress believed that
“foreign takeovers of U.S. firms could not be stopped unless the President
declared a national emergency or regulators invoked federal antitrust,
environmental, or securities laws.”64
In response to these growing concerns, Congress passed the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which included the Exon-Florio
provision endowing CFIUS with much of its present authority.65 Relying
on its power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress empowered the
President to block proposed foreign mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers
58

Joanna Rubin Travalini, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Achieving a
Balance Between National Economic Benefits and National Security Interests, 29 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 779, 783 (2009).
59
Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450.
60
Travalini, supra note 58.
61
Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National
Security or a Tempest in a Seaport?,70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 589 (2007).
62
Travalini, supra note 58.
63
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 4 (2009).
64
Id.
65
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102
Stat. 1107, 1425–26 (codified at 50 USC app. § 2170 (2012)).
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that “threaten to impair the national security” of the United States.66
However, the President could invoke this authority to block proposed FDI
only if two conditions were met: first, that no other law could adequately or
appropriately protect the national security interest, and second, that credible
evidence exists to believe that the proposed foreign investment will actually
threaten national security.67
Nonetheless, President Reagan issued
Executive Order 12661, which delegated his Exon-Florio authority to
CFIUS.68 This newfound ability to conduct investigations and make
presidential recommendations regarding proposed or completed foreign
mergers and acquisitions transformed CFIUS from a toothless
administrative body into a real consideration for foreign investors.69
While CFIUS provides an additional layer of review to guard against
potential national security threats, Congress did not intend to undercut its
commitment to an open investment policy.70 In a liberal economic system,
where “private ordering is favored and a trust of market forces is preached
to generate the most economically sound outcome,” the persistent challenge
is to broker a tenable balance between national security goals and economic
interests.71 Yet, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 raised the
stakes, rendering a heightened security environment.
Given the
transnational composition and sophisticated financing mechanisms of
global terrorism, Congress has sought to secure the borders.72 In 2003,
CFIUS not only created more stringent preconditions for approving foreign
acquisitions but also added the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
its membership.73 Accordingly, the DHS provided a clear national security
advocate in the foreign investment review process.
However, two developments in the global market triggered concerns
over the sufficiency of the CFIUS process during the late 2000s. First,
much like the 1980s, the depreciation of the dollar increased the
attractiveness of foreign investment in U.S. markets. Bracing for another
wave of FDI, Congress again sought to ensure that CFIUS was up to the
task of reviewing proposed foreign mergers in critical industries linked to
the U.S. national security apparatus.74 Second, the advent of sovereign
wealth funds, which are tied to foreign national governments, projected new
66

JACKSON, supra note 63, at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
68
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threats to American markets.75 Accordingly, the “prototypical new
purchasers of major assets . . . are government-controlled Chinese
companies and the sovereign investment funds of petrol-rich Gulf states.”76
For example, CFIUS became the focal point of criticism following the
botched national security review of an attempt by Dubai Ports World, a
company owned by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), to acquire several
U.S. ports.77 In its regular review process, CFIUS actually approved the
deal, finding no credible evidence of an actual national security threat.78
However, Congress, whose role in the review process was not clearly
delineated, rejected CFIUS’s findings regarding the proposed transaction.
Opponents of the acquisition feared foreign influence over U.S. port
operations given “UAE’s history as an operational and financial base for the
hijackers who carried out the September 11, 2001 attack.”79 Ultimately,
Congress voted to block the transaction, which sparked a new round of
concerns regarding the uncertainty of the CFIUS review process and
renewed the call for additional legislation that would “clarify the CFIUS’s
roles and powers.”80
Ultimately, Congress passed the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act of 2007 (FINSA)81 in order to address growing uncertainty
that followed Congress’s decision to block the Dubai Ports World deal after
CFIUS had already approved it. In order to avoid post-CFIUS interventions
in the future, Congress expanded its oversight role in the review process.82
Also, FINSA provided statutory grounding for CFIUS, which previously
had relied solely on authority flowing from President Ford’s Executive
Order in 1975.
By imposing heightened congressional reporting
requirements on CFIUS, the new law attempts to increase transparency in
the process by ensuring investors that each deal is thoroughly reviewed for
national security implications prior to approval.83 Concurrently, FINSA
establishes additional factors that CFIUS may consider in evaluating a
proposed transaction’s impact on national security.84 Finally, FINSA
formalizes the role of the intelligence agencies in the review process. 85
75
76
77
78
79
80
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Thus, FINSA attempts to strike an appropriate balance between protecting
U.S. national security interests and promoting FDI in U.S. markets.86
B. Key Features of the U.S. Model
In addition to the legislative expansion of its investigative and
advisory powers, CFIUS has also undergone structural transformations
since its inception in 1975.87 In its current form, the Secretary of Treasury
serves as the chairperson for the review body, which spans sixteen
governmental departments and offices.88 As membership in CFIUS has
expanded over the years, the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Justice,
and Homeland Security have continued to play the most active roles.89
Unsurprisingly, the Department of Defense has also played an influential
role in CFIUS’s national security assessments of foreign investment deals.90
Procedurally, only “covered transactions” are subject to CFIUS
review, though parties to a proposed foreign investment will usually
provide voluntary notice to CFIUS along with necessary information related
to the deal if it likely implicates national security. 91 Under CFIUS
regulations, “covered transactions” are defined as “any merger, acquisition,
or takeover which results in ‘foreign control of any person engaged in
interstate commerce in the United States.’”92 The Exon-Florio provision
permits members of CFIUS to independently trigger a review of a proposed
covered transaction.93 However, most filings are voluntary, because parties
to a foreign investment scheme understand that a failure to provide notice to
CFIUS may later subject the transaction to indefinite Executive review.94
CFIUS review process.
86
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Following a proper filing, the Staff Chairperson will circulate the portfolio
to CFIUS members for a maximum thirty-day review.
If CFIUS harbors concerns that a proposed transaction might affect
national security interests within that initial thirty-day review, then it must
conduct a secondary forty-five-day investigation to clear the deal or
recommend it for suspension or rejection.95 During this heightened stage,
the President, vis-à-vis CFIUS, must conduct a national security
investigation if one of the following three conditions is present:
(1) as a result of a review of the transaction, CFIUS determines that
the transactions threaten to impair the national security of the United
States and that the threat had not been mitigated during or prior to a
review of the transaction; (2) the foreign person is controlled by a
foreign government; or (3) the transactions would result in the
control of any critical infrastructure by a foreign person, the
transactions could impair the national security, and that such
impairment had not been mitigated.96

At any point during the review process, parties are entitled to voluntarily
withdraw from the review by nixing the deal, though they are subject to
continuing notification requirements if the parties decide to re-file or pursue
the transaction at a later date.97
During the forty-five-day investigation, three outcomes are possible.
First, CFIUS may clear the deal if it finds no national security threat.98 On
the other hand, if CFIUS does find a valid threat, it could still clear the deal
if another law can address the concern.99 Second, if CFIUS does find a
national security threat, then it may work with the parties to the transaction
to modify its terms to mitigate the national security concerns.100 Finally,
CFIUS may file a non-binding recommendation to the President to suspend
or reject the proposed transaction.101
Once a recommendation is made to the President, he or she will have
fifteen days to render a final decision as to the viability of the foreign
investment.102 Where a transaction has already been completed prior to the
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national security review, the President has the power to compel divesture.103
However, in order to provide certainty to investors, the President may not
prohibit a transaction if CFIUS had previously provided written notice to
the parties that the transaction was not subject to the Exon-Florio provision,
or affirmatively chose to forego review altogether, or the President had
chosen to forego intervention for the same transaction.104
The Exon-Florio provision originally established five factors for the
President, as well as individual members of CFIUS, to consider during
national security reviews of proposed foreign mergers, acquisitions, or
takeovers.105 In 2007, Congress added seven factors for consideration
during the review process.106 The amended Exon-Florio factors range from
the proposed foreign investment’s impact on production capacity to meet
national defense requirements to its effect on energy security, strategic
assets, critical infrastructure, or even U.S. “technological leadership in areas
affecting U.S. national security.”107 Consequently, opponents of the
103
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potential for transshipment or diversion of technologies with military applications;
(11) the long-term projection of the United States requirements for sources of
energy and other critical resources and materials; and
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national security review process are concerned that these amended factors
subject foreign investment transactions to greater hurdles in the approval
process.
Admittedly, CFIUS has evolved into a more intensive review body
with greater powers to block proposed foreign investments. Most notably,
the amendments broaden the scope of CFIUS review by including a host of
other economic security considerations in addition to the former, more
traditional national defense interests.108 In particular, the focus on “critical
infrastructure,” as defined broadly in the statute, enables the President to
consider a proposed transaction’s effect beyond national security, including
“national economic security and national public health or safety.”109
Finally, the lack of a specific, limited definition of “national security”
arguably subjects sound economic investments to an arbitrary and
capricious review process.110
Part V of this Comment, however,
demonstrates that these economic concerns are either overblown or
outweighed by other concerns.
IV. THE CHINESE APPROACH: CFIUS’S COUNTERPART
While the United States’ approach to reviewing foreign investments
for national security concerns has evolved for nearly four decades, China’s
framework is in its nascent stages. Given that China’s new model came
into existence in the wake of several failed acquisitions of U.S. companies
in the United States, some fear that the model is reactionary in motive.
However, China’s national security review process can also be seen as the
next logical step in the continued liberalization of its economy. This
portion of the Comment analyzes the historical buildup to China’s adoption
of a formal national security review process for foreign mergers and
acquisitions, as well as key features of the model.
A. Historical Development of the Chinese Model
Unlike the United States, the historical record for Chinese FDI policies
is relatively short. In fact, prior to 1983, China prohibited foreign
acquisitions of Chinese businesses altogether.111 Since then, however, the
world has witnessed an “ongoing transition of [China]’s economy from a
centrally planned one to a ‘market economy with socialist
(12) such other factors as the President or the Committee determine to be
appropriate.
Id.
108
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characteristics.’”112 As its economy has liberalized, China has become
more favorable to foreign investment and capital. In the decades spanning
1983 to 2003, however, the Chinese government lacked a standardized
framework for evaluating foreign mergers and acquisitions.113 Following a
contentious failed acquisition in 2006 of Xugong Construction Machinery
Group—China’s largest construction machinery manufacturer—by the
American-based management firm Carlyle Group,114 China’s Ministry of
Commerce adopted a revised set of regulations concerning foreign mergers
and acquisitions in China.115
Despite these newly adopted rules, China did not formally provide for
a national security review process for foreign mergers and acquisitions until
2007, when it adopted a long-awaited, comprehensive antitrust law.116
Within that legislation, Article 31 formally envisions concurrent national
security review of foreign investment, along with the primary antitrust
review.117 Even then, China still lacked a formalized national security
framework, such as CFIUS, until the United States blocked a controversial
merger between Huawei and 3Leaf in 2010.118
Finally, on February 3, 2011, China’s State Council General Office
issued the Notice Concerning Establishment of the Security Review System
on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors
(Security Review Notice).119 The Security Review Notice establishes the
Chinese counterpart to CFIUS—a national security review process for
foreign mergers and acquisitions in Chinese markets.120 After a six-month
trial period, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued the
Regulation on Implementing of the Security Review System for Mergers
112
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and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors.121
The motive behind China’s decision to pursue a formal national
security review process remains hotly contested. Arguably, the temporal
proximity of the Security Review Notice to the adverse CFIUS review of
the Huawei-3Leaf transaction suggests protectionist backlash. On the other
hand, China’s new review process for incoming foreign investments was
inevitable in light of its mention in Article 31 of China’s antitrust law.
Regardless of the reason, the international business community has
witnessed the rise of dueling national security review frameworks in the
United States and China—the world’s top two recipients of FDI.122
B. Key Features of the Chinese Model
Similar to CFIUS’s broad membership across governmental
departments, China’s national security review process involves an interministerial approach.123 China’s review body is referred to as the Joint
Inter-Ministerial Security Review Committee.124 At the helm, the National
Development and Reform Commission (NRDC) and MOFCOM serve as
the leadership for the national security review process under the Chinese
model.125 Similar to FINSA’s effect on CFIUS, the new national security
review legislation grounds the NRDC’s role with statutory authority, unlike
previously, where it served as an informal consultant to the review of
mergers and acquisitions for antitrust violations.126
Unlike the CFIUS framework, however, China’s new national security
review process mandates investors to file applications with MOFCOM in
order to initiate review of proposed transactions.127 The Chinese model’s
equivalent of a covered transaction is defined as a foreign merger or
acquisition involving any one of the following:
[1] A foreign investor purchases the equity interests of a Chinese
enterprise or subscribes to the increased capital of a Chinese
enterprise[;]
[2] A foreign investor purchases the equity interests of a Chinese
shareholder of a foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) in China or
subscribes to the increased capital of an FIE[;]
[3] A foreign investor sets up an FIE and uses it to purchase and
121
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operate the assets of a Chinese enterprise, or uses the FIE to
purchase the equity interests of a Chinese enterprise[;]
[4] A foreign investor directly purchases the assets of a Chinese
enterprise, and sets up an FIE in use of the assets, which then
operates on the assets[.]128

In addition to the Chinese review process’s coverage of direct mergers
and acquisitions, the framework also exercises jurisdiction over transactions
that would lead to de facto control of Chinese entities through foreign
investment. This includes:
(1) direct or indirect acquisition by a foreign investor of 50% or
more of the shares in a domestic enterprise; (2) acquisition by a
group of foreign investors of 50% or more of the shares in a
domestic enterprise; (3) acquisition of material influence over
decisions of the shareholders meeting or board of directors even with
less than 50% of the shares; or (4) acquisition of actual control over a
domestic enterprise’s policies, finances, personnel or technology.
The application to acquisition of actual control signifies that the
Security Regulations, like the AML, can reach offshore
transactions.129

Foreign investors that fall within the ambit of these investment
categories are required to file an application with MOFCOM to determine
whether further review is required.130 Similar to the CFIUS model, China’s
Security Review Committee is also empowered to independently open
national security investigations into proposed foreign investment
transactions.131 Unlike the U.S. framework, however, “other government
ministries, national trade associations, other companies in the industry and
domestic enterprises can also ask MOFCOM to initiate an investigation.”132
Thus, the Chinese model offers far greater avenues and opportunities to
scrutinize foreign mergers and acquisitions through the national security
review process.
Unlike the initial month-long investigation under CFIUS, once
MOFCOM initiates the review process, it will conduct a general review
lasting no longer than twenty days, during which the Security Review
Committee will “solicit written opinions from the relevant authorities.”133
Similar to the initial stage under CFIUS, this review enables MOFCOM to
clear a transaction where there is no evidence of an adverse national
128
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security impact stemming from the proposed transaction. However, if the
proposed transaction does raise national security concerns, the Security
Review Committee will conduct a heightened, secondary review process
that lasts no longer than sixty days.134 Similar to the American approach
under CFIUS, parties to a proposed transaction are free to withdraw their
application for review at any time during the heightened security review.135
At the conclusion of the secondary review stage, the Security Review
Committee can render three potential recommendations to MOFCOM: (1)
approve the transaction, (2) block the transaction, or (3) like the American
approach under FINSA, allow the transaction to proceed subject to remedial
preconditions.136 These recommendations, however, are non-binding, and
unlike the U.S. model where the President makes the final determination,
MOFCOM has the authority to take its own action, including the option to
divest the transaction.137
Similar to the CFIUS framework and its implementing regulations, the
rules set forth in China’s 2011 legislation establishes various factors for
consideration during its national security review process. These factors
include:
[1] Influence of the M&A transaction over national [defense]
(including capacity of manufacturing domestic products, providing
domestic services or providing the facilities and equipments in
question for national [defense])[;]
[2] Influence of the M&A transaction over the stable running of
China’s economy[;]
[3] Influence of the M&A transaction over basic social life and
order[;]
[4] Influence of the M&A transaction over research and development
of key technology regarding national security[.]138

Interestingly, the scope of review under the Chinese model is much
broader than the U.S. model. While the factors for consideration under
CFIUS also extend beyond national defense interests, the Chinese model
purportedly covers “transactions involving important agricultural products,
energy and resources, infrastructure facilities, and transportation services[,]
core technologies[,] and important equipment manufacturing
enterprises.”139 While both models raise hurdles for proposed transactions,
the Chinese national security review framework seemingly could cover
134
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transactions that have almost no nexus with national security.140 Thus,
China’s national security review model enjoys a broader scope of review
than its U.S. counterpart.141
V. CFIUS IN ACTION: A RESPONSE TO CRITICISM
While the immediate impact of China’s new model for reviewing
foreign mergers and acquisitions remains to be seen, its creation has
reinvigorated critics of national security reviews. Their concerns revolve
around issues of general transparency,142 ambiguous scope,143 potential
backlash from perceived protectionism,144 and the politicization of
economics.145 The common thread linking the diverse critiques of national
security reviews of foreign investment is a general uneasiness over
Congress’s perceived interference in free trade and economics. However, it
is common knowledge that the U.S. Constitution secures the role of
Congress in regulating interstate commerce.146 The more relevant question
is whether Congress’s regulation of foreign mergers and acquisitions vis-àvis CFIUS is sufficiently transparent to minimize the chilling effect on
economic relations. By this measure, CFIUS has admittedly rendered
mixed results in the past, thereby validating—at least in part—the abovementioned criticisms.
This portion of the Comment addresses past arbitrary congressional
action involving CFIUS reviews of proposed Chinese acquisitions of U.S.
companies. This Part argues that legislative amendments to CFIUS have
since addressed concerns of transparency, ambiguity, and politicization of
trade. Various case studies demonstrate that a changing national security
landscape, as well as an evolving national security review process, negates
or outweighs the proposed costs of CFIUS and its Chinese counterpart.
A. Ensuring Transparency
Perhaps the most controversial transaction that fell victim to national
security concerns in the United States involves China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC) and its attempted takeover of California-based
140
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energy firm Unocal in 2005.147 Amidst negotiations by Chevron—an
American multinational energy corporation—to purchase Unocal, CNOOC
interjected with an unsolicited $18.5 billion takeover bid that topped
Chevron’s offer by nearly $2 billion.148 The very next day, forty-one
members of Congress requested immediate CFIUS review of the proposed
Chinese takeover as a matter of U.S. national security.149 Within a week,
Congress overwhelmingly passed House Resolution 344, formally voicing
its concerns over the proposed acquisition.150 As a sign of good faith,
CNOOC voluntarily requested that CFIUS analyze the transaction for
potential national security complications.151 Yet, the intense scrutiny
rendered the proposed Chinese takeover dead on arrival—CNOOC
ultimately withdrew its bid to acquire Unocal in the face of insurmountable
congressional pushback.152
The CNOOC-Unocal fiasco has justifiably served as the poster child
for the purported lack of transparency in the U.S. national security review
process. In many ways, CNOOC’s failed attempt to acquire UNOCAL
demonstrates Congress’s perception of CFIUS as a weak review body prior
to the passage of FINSA in 2007. Indeed, CNOOC ultimately withdrew its
bid in the face of strong legislative opposition to the proposed merger,
rather than formal negative treatment by CFIUS. In its press release
following the withdrawal, CNOOC blamed “unprecedented political
opposition” from Congress that ultimately created a “level of uncertainty
that present[ed] an unacceptable risk” to completing the merger.153 Still, it
is unlikely that CNOOC would have secured approval from the President
even if CFIUS had the opportunity to review the transaction for potential
national security concerns.154
It is important to note that Congress’s staunch opposition to the
CNOOC-Unocal transaction—though controversial—was justified. Indeed,
Congress expressed a variety of national security concerns surrounding a
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potential CNOOC-Unocal merger in House Resolution 344.155 While the
proposed merger fell apart prior to formal CFIUS review, the objections
offered in the Resolution provide insight into the likely outcome had the
proposed deal reached the formal national security review process.
Arguably, Congress’s fundamental concern with the merger—as
House Resolution 344 indicates—stemmed from CNOOC’s corporate
structure and identity: “China owns approximately 70 percent of
CNOOC.”156 In addition to CNOOC’s significant ties to the Chinese
government, the proposed merger would have been “financed and heavily
subsidized” by state-owned banking institutions.157
In a parallel
investigation of the proposed transaction, the House Armed Services
Committee expounded on this concern: “Chinese enterprises do not behave
as normal commercial companies on the international market.”158 Unlike
purely private foreign investment, the CNOOC-Unocal transaction would
have effectively injected a foreign power into the U.S. economy.
Second, the Resolution voices national security concerns arising from
CNOOC’s potential control over oil and natural gas resources, which are
paramount strategic assets.159 Citing China’s increasingly voracious
appetite for oil, the Resolution emphasized the strategic importance of
maintaining U.S. control over its own energy resources.160 The proposed
merger, on the other hand, “would result in [Unocal’s] strategic assets . . .
being preferentially allocated to China by the Chinese government.”161 As
a result, the Resolution found that CNOOC would directly control nearly
one-third of excess oil supply in the world.162 Moreover, the House Armed
Services Committee found that Unocal’s oil reserves spanned the globe
“from the Gulf of Mexico to the Caspian region to Southeast Asia, as well
as in Africa, Europe, and South America.”163 Thus, China’s acquisition of
Unocal’s strategic assets vis-à-vis CNOOC would present a zero-sum
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reduction of U.S. influence in those regional oil markets.164
Finally, the Resolution forewarned of the potential proliferation of
sensitive dual-use technologies165 employed in the oil industry for
exploration, production, and refining.166 “The dangerous possibility of
these dual commercial/military use technologies falling into Chinese hands
is alarming given the tenuous nature of Sino-American relations.”167
Coupled with China’s unconcealed desire to acquire advanced technology
through FDIs,168 its oil companies, like CNOOC, operate in countries
currently facing U.S. economic and military sanctions.169 The risk of
secondary proliferation of these sensitive, dual-use technologies to adverse
countries, such as Iran, would also threaten U.S. national security.170
Nevertheless, the failure of the formal national security process to take
effect in the proposed CNOOC-Unocal acquisition feeds the perception that
Congress may obstruct viable transactions in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. Admittedly, “without thorough statutory review, the case-by-case
approach in each transaction provides little regularity and poor
transparency.”171 Despite CNOOC’s late attempt to voluntarily submit
information about the proposed transaction to CFIUS, “congressional
leaders haphazardly held press conferences, gave interviews, and introduced
legislation, the product of which was a political snowball against which
CNOOC . . . had no hope.”172 The lack of clear, identifiable criteria within
the national security review process will stoke future criticism of CFIUS as
a non-transparent, unbridled oversight body.173
Fortunately, CFIUS has undergone various transformative changes
since the CNOOC-Unocal debacle.174 In 2007, Congress approved FINSA,
which made several critical changes to the preexisting iteration of CFIUS,
primarily to ensure a more transparent national security review process.175
For example, FINSA now mandates initial review of all covered
transaction, which “ensur[es] that every transaction involving foreign
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investment receives attention from the CFIUS.” 176 Thus, parties to a
proposed foreign merger, acquisition, or takeover can expect to provide
preliminary information about the deal regardless of whether CFIUS
initiates the review or the parties themselves voluntarily seek government
approval.
Additionally, FINSA serves to provide parties to a covered transaction
with common risk factors that have implicated U.S. national security in the
past.177 For instance, CFIUS is now required to “issue guidance on the
types of transactions previously reviewed that presented national security
and critical infrastructure concerns.”178 Also, “Implementing regulations
finalized in 2008 provide many illustrative examples to show what level of
corporate control is sufficient to trigger CFIUS review.”179 Prior to the
passage of FINSA, foreign corporations like CNOOC lacked notice of
thresholds for transactional risk that could trigger CFIUS review.
Furthermore, FINSA introduces specific reporting requirements for
CFIUS in an effort to limit broader congressional intervention in the
national security review process. Prior to FINSA, “The Exon-Florio
amendment required quadrennial reports to Congress, yet after an initial
report in 1993 no such reports were submitted for the next dozen years.”180
Following passage of FINSA, CFIUS must now submit an annual report to
Congress that “summarize[s] trends and the previous year’s activity.”181
For pending transactions under review, FINSA also mandates that CFIUS
provide notice and certification of its findings during the forty-five-day,
secondary review phase for a specified transaction.182 These amended
requirements increase the transparency of the CFIUS review process, define
Congress’s role in national security reviews of foreign investment, and
deter premature, capricious governmental intervention.183
In retrospect, critics of CFIUS are admittedly correct to point out the
review body’s checkered history of operational transparency. The botched
CNOOC-Unocal merger certainly fanned the fears of an arbitrary national
176
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security review process that left foreign investors uncertain about future
transactions. Congress has since legislated improvements to CFIUS in an
effort to increase transparency and to clarify congressional involvement in
these national security reviews. Indeed, the CNOOC-Unocal controversy is
a reminder of the importance of such measures, which serve to render a
more predictable review process where the transaction does in fact
implicate U.S. national security interests.
B. Defining National Security
Since CNOOC withdrew its bid to acquire Unocal, two other failed
foreign acquisitions involving Chinese corporations have fueled criticism of
CFIUS’s scope. In particular, Congress has failed to establish a “functional
definition of the national economic security implications of foreign direct
investment.”184 This lack of a clear statutory definition of the term
“national security” raises fears of far-reaching reviews.185 As a result,
critics contend that heightened congressional involvement will lead to the
politicization of foreign investment.186
However, this fear of congressional over-involvement overlooks the
historical foundation of U.S. economics, as well as the current realities of
global threats.187 In response to the heightened security environment
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,188 Congress broadened
the scope of national security considerations through the passage the USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001, which added “critical infrastructure” as part of the
nation’s security apparatus.189 In light of this shift in congressional attitude,
“policymakers have concluded that economic activities are a separately
identifiable component of national security.”190 Thus, a broader approach
to CFIUS review of foreign investment is necessary to address modern
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threats of economic espionage.191
In fact, Congress intentionally declined to provide a more limited
definition of “national security” within the Exon-Florio statute.192 Instead,
Congress envisioned a flexible interpretation of the term in order to cut
across various critical industries.193 While this approach does invite some
unpredictability, the Department of Treasury states that “each member of
CFIUS is expected to apply that definition of national security that is
consistent with the representative agency’s specific legislative mandate.”194
Congress also added several factors to consider in evaluating national
security implications of FDI, in particular, the proposed transaction’s
impact on “critical infrastructure” in the United States.195
Critics ultimately fear that such a broad definition of national security
enables Congress to politicize foreign investment by disfavoring countries,
such as China, that might represent a threat to U.S. economic hegemony. 196
Admittedly, this concern arises each time a political body like Congress
regulates any field. By constitutional design, however, FDI falls within the
Legislature’s purview to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. As
such, “many policymakers apparently perceive greater risks to the economy
arising from foreign investments in which the foreign investor is owned or
controlled by foreign governments.”197 More importantly, critics that reject
Congress’s broad role in regulating FDI fail to appreciate a new reality—
national economy and national security are inherently intertwined.
1. Firstgold & Northwest Non-Ferrous International Investment Company
Following the passage of FINSA and Congress’s attempt to clarify the
national security review process, CFIUS again found itself embroiled in
controversy during a Chinese investment company’s friendly takeover bid
of Firstgold—a relatively small mining company based in Nevada. In July
2009, Firstgold announced that China’s Northwest Non-Ferrous
International Investment Company (Northwest) had agreed to purchase
191
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$26.5 million in secured debt in return for a “51 percent of outstanding
common shares to become Firstgold’s majority shareholder.”198 Unlike the
CNOOC-Unocal fiasco, however, Congress “made no public statements
regarding the Firstgold deal, instead allowing CFIUS alone to resolve its
security concerns.”199 Nonetheless, Northwest’s bid to acquire Firstgold
ultimately shared the same fate as CNOOC, as the deal fell apart in the face
of impending negative treatment by CFIUS.200
As the two parties to the agreement voluntarily withdrew from CFIUS
review, Firstgold CEO Terry Lynch publicly expressed that he failed to
understand the nexus between his company’s assets, which primarily
consisted of an open-pit facility at Relief Canyon Mine,201 and U.S. national
security.202 In fact, neither party seemingly believed that the transaction
would implicate national security, given the relatively small size of the
investment and the nature of Firstgold’s business as compared to other
transactions that triggered CFIUS review in the past.203 However, once
Firstgold and Northwest volunteered for national security review, CFIUS
found that the deal was clearly a “covered transaction,” given that the
proposed acquisition would result in foreign control over Firstgold.
Upon closer examination, a unique set of circumstances surrounding
the transaction led CFIUS to render an adverse recommendation to
President Obama to block the acquisition. First, the identity and corporate
structure of Northwest—an investment firm owned and operated by the
Chinese provincial government of Shaanxi—raised the same red flag as in
the CNOOC ordeal. “Procedurally, Section 721 [of the Defense Production
Act of 1950] virtually mandates that CFIUS proceed to the full
investigation stage where the foreign investing party is state-owned or
controlled.”204 Though this factor is not conclusive to CFIUS’s ultimate
findings, Firstgold’s shock that CFIUS chose to conduct the secondary
forty-five-day review appears unfounded.205
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The second and perhaps the most determinative factor that compelled
CFIUS to render an adverse recommendation was the target company’s
location. While the proposed transaction arguably did not involve a
strategic asset—such as oil in the earlier CNOOC-Unocal merger—the
physical site of Firstgold’s assets posed a unique threat to U.S. national
security interests.206 “The primary source of concern among CFIUS
officials was the proximity of four mines to the Fallon Naval Air
Station.”207
Moreover, in a publicly leaked memorandum of the
Committee’s communication with Firstgold, CFIUS officials suggested a
possible national security threat to “other sensitive and classified security
and military assets that cannot be identified.”208 Arguably, these unique
circumstances surrounding the Firstgold-Northwest transaction made an
adverse CFIUS review unavoidable.209 The bottom line is that “location
matters when military facilities occupy the neighborhood.”210
2. Huawei & 3Leaf Systems
More recently, CFIUS again flexed its newfound authority in
requesting the divestment of a completed acquisition involving Huawei
Technologies Company and California-based 3Leaf Systems.211 In May
2010, Huawei spent $2 million for intellectual property rights from 3Leaf, a
company that “specializes in building servers to run together as more
powerful mainframe computers.212
Huawei—China’s largest
telecommunications equipment manufacturer—and 3Leaf consummated the
deal without voluntary notice to CFIUS.213 Acting on its independent
206
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review authority, CFIUS requested that Huawei initiate the review process
to determine if national security issues were present in the completed
transaction.214
Nearly nine months after Huawei acquired various
technology patents from 3Leaf, CFIUS ultimately recommended
“voluntary” divestment or risk an adverse recommendation to President
Obama to undo the deal.215
Similar to the fates of CNOOC and Northwest in their acquisition
attempts, Huawei came under close scrutiny given its corporate identity.
However, its failed attempt to acquire 3Leaf assets is not the first time
Huawei has been subjected to the national security review process for
foreign mergers and acquisitions.216 In the past five years, Huawei
repeatedly found itself on CFIUS’s radar due to security concerns with
failed transactions involving 3Com and Sprint.217 Indeed, American
lawmakers have shown a deep-seated distrust of Huawei due to its
purported ties with the Chinese military.218 According to a 2005 RAND
report, Huawei—touted as a “national champion” in China—purportedly
“maintains deep ties with the Chinese military, which serves a multi-faceted
role as an important customer, as well as Huawei’s political patron and
research and development partner.”219
Given these findings, it is no surprise that CFIUS has repeatedly
scrutinized Huawei’s attempts to enter into the U.S. telecommunications
market, a critical infrastructure directly implicating the Exon-Florio factors
for consideration in the national security review process.220 Indeed,
Huawei’s purported link to the Chinese military raises the specter of
economic or cyber espionage by allowing Huawei to potentially corrupt
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telecommunications equipment that the Department of Defense or other
vestiges of the national security apparatus relies upon.221 Coupled with the
uptick in Chinese cyber-attacks on U.S. critical infrastructures, Huawei’s
potential ties to China’s military poses a considerable roadblock to its
aspirations in penetrating markets that potentially implicate U.S. national
security interests.222
Ultimately, the failed foreign investment transactions between
Northwest and Firstgold, as well as Huawei and 3Leaf, demonstrate the
need for a broad approach to defining national security within the CFIUS
review process. While both transactions suggest hostility toward Chinese
multinational corporations, CFIUS’s response in each appropriately
considered real national security implications in the proposed transactions.
The target company’s physical proximity to military installations or the
acquiring company’s ties to a foreign military raises red flags for any
sovereign, because these attributes increase the potential for economic or
military espionage. More importantly, a narrow interpretation of “national
security” in the review process for foreign investments would likely
overlook such possibilities for information leakage or technology transfer.
Thus, the broader conceptualization of “national security” by CFIUS is
necessary to deal with nuanced threats in the era of globalization.
C. Managing Economic Repercussions
As a response to the realities of the post-9/11 security environment, an
increased role for CFIUS in regulating foreign investment is well-intended.
However, the unintended or perceived consequences of a particular policy
can ultimately be as important to its success. Prior to the passage of
FINSA, critics forewarned that “[s]ubstantial changes in the analytical
framework governing [CFIUS’s] evaluation of national security
considerations related to proposed mergers, acquisitions and takeovers
could have sweeping implications for investor confidence.”223 This
criticism is grounded in the overblown charges of non-transparency and
ambiguity addressed above.224 If true, investor uncertainty theoretically
“could lead foreign firms to abandon plans to merge, or acquire American
companies entirely.”225 Moreover, the added scrutiny admittedly increases
delays in foreign acquisitions, which could negatively impact FDI in the
United States.226
Even worse, some fear that foreign investors—and their respective
221
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governments—will perceive heightened CFIUS review as economic
protectionism.227 At least one critic goes so far as to argue that “identifying
the factors that lead to blockage of the deal might be the equivalent of
declaring hostilities against the acquiring company’s government.” 228
Given the United States’ traditional policy of open investment, critics
contend that perceived hostility to foreign mergers or acquisitions involving
U.S. companies will trigger protectionist backlash.229 It is argued that such
“[o]verreaching U.S. regulation of foreign investment will trigger retaliation
by other governments and undoubtedly hurt U.S. investors abroad.”230
China’s recent CFIUS-like model regulating foreign investment provides
timely fodder for such criticisms.231
Much like the complaints regarding CFIUS’s overbroad scope and lack
of transparency, these economic concerns are ultimately outweighed.
Above all, the United States is one of many major economies that permits
governmental regulation of foreign mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers.232
Arguably, “there are more, and better developed, statutory restrictions on
foreign investment in place in foreign jurisdictions than in the United
States.”233
While China’s newly-created national security review
framework follows on the heels of the failed Huawei-3Leaf transaction, its
policy to review foreign investment for potential national security threats
was already well-established by its antitrust regulations released in 2007.234
Rather, China’s heightened national security review process—much
like CFIUS in the United States—comports with global standards. For
example, many of the world’s prominent international trade regimes, like
the WTO, “allow signatory nations the right to deny foreign investment in
areas of the economy deemed integral to the national security interests of
that nation.”235 The notion that CFIUS undercuts the global liberal
227
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economy is inconsistent with the widely-held belief that a nation has the
right to protect its national security from adverse foreign investment. “This
exception to free trade has been a part of the global economy since the
earliest free trade agreements.”236 CFIUS is no exception to that
international standard.
This defense of CFIUS’s role in the global economy does not purport
to argue that national security reviews have no impact on a nation’s
economic calculus. On the contrary, as one policy expert explains:
Within the economy, economic theory maintains that demand and
supply forces determine the market prices for labor and for capital as
the various sectors compete for these scarce resources. These market
prices, then, work to allocate resources within the economy among
the vast array of economic activities that use the resources in the
most efficient manner. Interference in this process, regardless of the
reason, can cause a misallocation of resources in the economy and a
loss of efficiency, which imposes a cost on the economy as a
whole.237

Admittedly, the national security review process for foreign
investment potentially interferes with otherwise economically viable
mergers or acquisitions. For example, in the failed CNOOC-Unocal
acquisition, Unocal was arguably deprived of capitalizing on CNOOC’s
offer, which exceeded Chevron’s eventual winning bid by approximately $2
billion.238 Thus, regulatory frameworks like CFIUS “may also alter the
allocation of capital within the economy and, thereby, incur short-term and
long-term costs to the economy.”239
Nonetheless, critics’ claims regarding the adverse economic impacts of
CFIUS fail to capture the complexity of calculating economic costs.
Simply calculating the lost value of a CFIUS-blocked foreign investment as
a tell-tale economic cost ignores the national security benefits captured.
Critics are correct in pointing out that such national security benefits are not
easily quantifiable and are context-dependent.240 That contention, however,
is a double-edged sword. Simply put, there is no “precise way . . . to
estimate the exact dollar amount for the economic costs and benefits of
national policies that attempt to direct or restrict foreign direct investment
for national security concerns.”241 However there is one certainty: the costs
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associated with adverse foreign investment, including economic espionage
or the transfer of lucrative intellectual property to the acquiring country are
staggering.242 Accordingly, in order to justify CFIUS’s intervention in any
particular proposed foreign investment, policymakers will have to weigh
the economic and non-economic costs and benefits. This balancing
approach is more of an art than a science, which critics tend to overlook.
Instead, critics of CFIUS review—and its foreign counterparts—focus
on statistics that seemingly support their fears of regression in the face of
increased regulations. For example, it is true that the amount of FDI
declined by nearly twenty-five percent from 2008 to 2009.243 That statistic,
however, is hardly conclusive of the purported decline in FDI as a result of
a heightened national security review process following passage of FINSA
in 2007. For instance, the amount of FDI into the United States in 2008
“set a record in nominal terms for the most amount of foreign direct
investment in the economy in a year.”244 While fiscal year 2009 failed to
match that impressive mark from the year before in absolute terms,
cumulative FDI still increased by seven percent.245
More importantly, critics relying on general year-to-year changes in
FDI ignore the importance of economic conditions in encouraging foreign
investment in the first place. “The decrease in foreign direct investment
flows mirrors a slowdown in global flows.”246 It is no secret that the U.S.
economy is not immune to the global economic crisis, which has adversely
impacted foreign mergers and acquisitions.247 Conversely, “As the rate of
growth of the U.S. economy rises, interests rates stay low, and the rate of
price inflation stays in check, foreign direct investment . . . likely will
continue to rise.”248 Given these current global economic conditions, it
would be disingenuous to argue that CFIUS is the driver of a contraction in
foreign investment. Rather, foreign investment is as much a function of a
complex globalized economy as it is of a heightened domestic regulatory
regime.
Nonetheless, “[t]he real test for the amended regulatory framework”
will rest in part upon “the ability of the executive branch to inspire and
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maintain public confidence in the new CFIUS process.”249 Fortunately,
legislative amendments to CFIUS since its inception provide significant
measures to ensure investor confidence in foreign mergers and acquisitions
in the United States. FINSA in particular strengthened the CFIUS
framework to reify an open investment policy while assuaging Congress
that national security concerns are also addressed.
Above all, FINSA significantly normalized the CFIUS review process
by increasing congressional oversight vis-à-vis reporting requirements.250
Moreover, the latest iteration of CFIUS regulations require the Department
of Treasury to conduct extensive analysis of FDI in the United States that
may implicate national security interests.251 These requirements “allow for
greater transparency while maintaining the evaluation and decision-making
process entirely within the [E]xecutive branch.”252
This added
congressional oversight increases overall accountability, which ensures
foreign investors that CFIUS will “be armed with a strong case in support
of its decision and would be able to respond more persuasively to close
congressional scrutiny.”253
Ultimately, this assurance is crucial to
preserving confidence in the national security review framework for foreign
investments.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the United States has always been a staunch supporter of open
investment policies globally, national security concerns have long been
recognized as a valid limitation on foreign mergers. These national security
249
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considerations are understandably heightened in the era of globalization,
where transnational forces easily penetrate national borders. Since the
1970s, the U.S. national security review process for foreign mergers,
acquisitions, and takeovers of U.S. corporations has undergone several
transformations. At each stage of its development, proponents of economic
liberalism have challenged the review process as being antithetical to open
investment policies. Since the passage of the Foreign Investment and
National Security Act of 2007, however, the U.S. national security review
process has featured an intricate balance in protecting U.S. national security
while promoting national economic interests.
However, one fear of the U.S. approach has seemingly come to
fruition.
Perhaps in retaliation to well-documented failed foreign
acquisition attempts in the United States due to national security concerns,
China has established its own national security review process. This
Comment argues, CFIUS’s new counterpart in mainland China is not
surprising given the projected influx of foreign investment into China and
its booming economy. Rather, China’s model, despite its over-broadness, is
a natural reaction to protect its national security. Indeed, the United States
established its security review process for foreign mergers in the 1970s.
Despite concerns from economists, both countries enjoy a healthy dose of
FDI. For China, however, it remains to be seen whether its review process
successfully balances its national security and economic interests as well as
its U.S. counterpart in CFIUS.
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